Revenge of the Canaliens[1]: Illegal Detention of US Asylum-Seekers in Panama

In his second term, President Trump has vowed to “carry out the largest domestic deportation operation in American history,” targeting the illegal immigrants he claims are “poisoning the blood of the US.”[2] Despite diverting resources from other government agencies into U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), attempting to shut down asylum at the southern border, and securing land to erect new detention centers, actually deporting individuals quickly enough to keep up with ICE’s seizures has proved a significant challenge.[3] Deportation becomes especially challenging in cases where the immigrants’ countries of origin have poor diplomatic relations with the US and, thus, are unwilling to accept them back.

In a novel maneuver, President Trump has outsourced this rate-limiting step to third-party countries in Central America. Most likely due to Trump’s threats to employ military force in the Panama Canal, the Panamanian government has agreed to accept hundreds of immigrants who arrived in the US illegally.[4] These people, many of whom are seeking asylum due to fear of persecution or torture in their countries of origin, are currently being detained indefinitely in Panama without access to their lawyers.[5] Forcing asylum seekers to endure indefinite detention until agreeing to return to their countries of origin, especially without any semblance of due process, is a violation of the US Constitution and Panamanian law, in addition to international human rights obligations, and must cease immediately.[6]

Before the construction of the Panama Canal, ships carrying goods between the east and west coasts of the Americas had to sail far south and around Cape Horn. Throughout the 19th century, imperial powers with American colonies and business owners alike sought to eliminate this long and perilous journey by constructing a passageway through what is now Panama.[7] In the 1880s, Ferdinand de Lesseps nearly bankrupted France attempting to build a canal through the Isthmus. Over 9 years, 20,000 workers died from malaria, yellow fever, and other tropical diseases.[8]

In 1903, the US signed the Hay-Herrán treaty with Colombia securing them use of the Isthmus of Panama in return for financial compensation.[9] The Colombian Senate, however, was unsatisfied with the terms including the payment the US offered. Viewing the treaty as a threat to their sovereignty, they refused to pass it. In response, the United States began to support the secession efforts of Panamanian Nationalists. During the November 3, 1903 rebellion, the US impeded Colombian troops sent to quell the insurgents and dispatched a warship to deter Colombian military action in Panama.[10] Only 3 days later, the US recognized the provisional Panamanian government in return for permanent and proprietary control of the Panama Canal Zone as laid out in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty on November 18th, 1903. The Panamanian government was compensated with an upfront payment of $10 million and an annuity of $250,000 starting after 9 years.[11]

Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French citizen and the Panamanian minister to the United States played a seminal role in negotiating both the US involvement in the Panamanian revolution and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty. Before his appointment to the Panamanian government, Bunau-Varilla served as an engineer for de Lesseps on the Isthmus, advocating for the revival of the canal initiative after its failure. Despite securing the success of the Panamanian revolution through meetings with US officials, Bunau-Varilla was appointed to the government only after refusing to seek international recognition for Panama without being afforded official status. Though Panama sought similar terms to the Hay- Herrán treaty, they also looked to secure greater protections for their sovereignty.[12] Entering negotiations without formal consent, however, Bunau-Varilla had unchecked influence to enshrine his personal interests in legislation.[13]

The terms of the Panama Canal Zone treaty, dictated by the interests of international powers, set the stage for decades of US dominance over a young Panama. The 10-mile-wide zone was inhabited by a group of Americans dubbed the “Zonians,” who operated and maintained the canal. Over a few generations, these families became fiercely insular and inward-looking. Many children born within the zone grew up without ever entering the Republic of Panama. In the words of Principal Officer Stephen Bosworth, “They were American colonials.”  Over decades of pseudo-colonial occupation, hostilities brewed between the Panamanians and the Zonians. According to Ovidio Diaz-Espino, author of The Canal Zone, the Panamanians resented that the strip of land dividing their country was off-limits to them, “[The Zonians] had everything. They had golf courses, they had recreation centers and at the other side of the fence was Panama.” In 1964, American students lowered the Panamanian flag that flew alongside the American flag in the Canal Zone in a demonstration of American nationalism. A counter-protest by Panamanian university students spiraled into a series of violent riots so severe that the US evacuated their Embassy. Panamanian President Roberto Chiari insisted on the negotiation of a new treaty concerning the canal before resuming diplomatic relations.[14]

This demand did not endure, as the two countries resumed diplomatic relations a few months later. Nevertheless, both recognized the importance of ratifying a new treaty. Ellsworth Bunker, appointed to lead the US delegation under the Nixon administration, focused on securing “perpetual U.S. use of the Panama Canal, rather than perpetual U.S. control of the Panama Canal Zone.” When the treaties eventually passed under the Carter Administration, they were split into The Panama Canal Treaty, which stated that “the Panama Canal Zone would cease to exist on October 1, 1979, and the Canal itself would be turned over to the Panamanians on December 31, 1999,” and The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, which afforded the US rights to militarily secure the Panama Canal against threats to its neutrality.[15] Like the initial Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty, the Carter-Torrijos treaties contained a loophole that would ensure the US retained power over the canal. Although Panama itself does not have a military, the US retains a standing right to send military forces into the Canal at its discretion.[16] President Trump has exploited this capability as he attempts to outsource the mechanism of his promised mass deportation.

During his previous term, President Trump deported about 1.5 million people. Based on the suggestions of his current administration, he is looking to deport 1 million people per year in his second term.[17] Rather than focusing resources on deporting unauthorized immigrants who have committed serious crimes, the Trump Administration seeks to criminalize any US residents currently lacking legal status and block new immigrants from gaining legal status. Under a January 23rd directive, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to co-opt resources and personnel from four other government agencies to assist ICE in prosecuting immigrants, rather than their usual focus on legitimate security threats. These tactics have resulted in wrongful arrests and detentions of Veterans, US citizens, and Native American Tribe members, and target immigrants who are contributing members of American society. As the Center for American Progress writes, “This ineffective immigration enforcement strategy is tearing families apart while making the country less safe.”[18]

On January 20th, 2025, President Trump issued two pieces of Executive Action essentially ending the asylum rights guaranteed by Congress in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).[19] The Executive Order, Securing Our Borders, reinstated the Migration Protection Protocols (MPP) for the third time, requiring the majority of asylum-seekers to remain in Mexico while awaiting their hearings.[20] Initially enacted in 2019, the first iteration of this policy sent 68,000 migrants back to Mexico. Under the Biden Administration, the program was terminated due to “widespread reports of severe human rights violations, high costs, an increase in repeat border crossings, and serious logistical problems.” In reinstating MPP, Trump bars migrants from residing within the US while progressing through the asylum process.[21]

When previously in action, MPP placed immense strain on the US government itself. While the transportation of asylum seekers across the border for legal proceedings diverted resources from Customs and Border Protection, the immigration courts struggled to process a high volume of cases. Temporary tent courts erected in Laredo and Brownsville to allow asylum seekers to virtually appear before judges cost $168 million to operate. Due to the shortage of immigration judges in the region, judges were forced to suspend their dockets as they were reassigned from cases in the interior to those at the border. With only four judges available to hear thousands of cases in El Paso, files piled up and hearings courts delayed hearings for months.[22] The American Immigration Lawyers Association reports the pressure from the Trump Administration to prioritize speed over accuracy “transformed the immigration courts into an enforcement agency rather than a fair and neutral arbiter.”[23] With the Second Trump Administration firing 20 immigration judges within the past month, these issues will only worsen.[24]

The agencies of the executive branch also struggled with poor enforcement on the ground during the first iteration of the MPP. Under the INA, asylum-seekers are guaranteed the right to a screening interview in which an asylum officer will determine if they have a critical fear of being tortured or persecuted upon return to their country of origin.[25] This process ensures the US fulfills the principles of non-refoulement detailed in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.[26] Because MPP included the initial return of migrants to Mexico even before deportation, the US government had to conduct a preliminary assessment for any migrants who expressed fear of returning to Mexico. Processing these cases required asylum officers to divert their attention from their regular cases and, similarly to the immigration courts, prioritize speed over accuracy.[27]

In fact, Border Patrol officers did not ask migrants if they feared returning to Mexico, instead requiring them to “assert fear” to progress into a credible fear interview. Asylum officers reported facing significant pressure to deny these credible fear claims and send people back to Mexico. Ultimately, the percentage of people who passed their credible fear interviews ranged from only 1 to 13%, and many migrants were not even interviewed before being forced to return to Mexico. In 2019, the asylum officer labor union filed an amicus brief with the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals to strike down MPP as “fundamentally contrary to the moral fabric of our nation and our international and domestic legal obligations.” Clearly, this policy is a de facto violation of due process, and the legal challenges from Trump’s first term asserted as much. When the Biden Administration ended MPP, however, the pending court decisions were rendered moot, allowing for the program’s recent reinstatement.[28]

Beyond impracticality for the US government, MPP is also extremely inhumane. During President Trump’s previous term, the US government failed to provide any form of support to asylum-seekers after returning them to Mexican border towns. As a result, individuals and even families were subjected to extreme danger including kidnapping, assault, and lack of shelter. Exposure to these conditions made it nearly impossible for these migrants to secure asylum. Just 7.5% of migrants in MPP were able to secure legal representation and thousands of migrants were unable to return to court for their scheduled dates because they were victims of kidnapping, their court paperwork was stolen, or the dangerous conditions of the border forced them to abandon their cases. By 2021, only about 1% of individuals subjected to MPP won relief.[29] In establishing that asylum-seekers can be refused entry into the US while their cases progress, MPP paved the way for Trump’s recent displacement of asylum-seekers to Panama.

The second Executive Action Trump issued on January 20th was Proclamation 10888, Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion. Declaring an invasion at the southern border, the proclamation invokes Section 212(f) of the INA, an emergency action clause allowing the President to “suspend the entry” of noncitizens when their entry is found to be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.”[30] Within his declaration of an invasion, however, Trump fails to identify a class of noncitizens whose entry is suspended, identify what benchmarks define this invasion, specify what data would demonstrate the end of the invasion, or provide a timeline for reexamining the state of invasion. In contrast to Trump’s claims, the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Releases Monthly Updates demonstrate that November and December of 2024 saw the lowest level of immigration encounters at the southwest border “since August 2020 and lower than the monthly average for 2019.”[31] Beyond this data, heightened levels of immigration do not constitute an invasion “within the meaning of Article IV, Section 4 or any other part of the Constitution,” as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) emphasizes in a recently filed lawsuit against the Trump Administration.[32]

In falsely citing Section 212(f) of the INA, Trump attempts to circumvent protections of migrants’ right to claim asylum once on US soil. Under the INA, “Noncitizens who are ‘physically present’ or ‘arrive[] in’ the United States have a statutory right to apply for asylum.”[33] With the proclamation currently in effect, however, migrants at the southern border have no avenue of claiming asylum, even if they present at a port of entry, which constitutes arrival in the US.[34]

This application of Section 212(f) of the INA contradicts a robust body of precedent. The ACLU states, “Never has a President invoked Section 212(f) to expel individuals who are already physically present in the United States or to bar such individuals from seeking relief from removal.” Since the first invocation of Section 212(f) in 1981, “the Executive Branch has expressly and repeatedly recognized that Section 212(f) does not permit the President to alter the asylum rights and procedures that Congress enacted elsewhere in the INA,” even in a 1984 case of asylum-seekers who arrived in the US by hijacking a plane. In 2018, the DHS and the Department of Justice both determined that even if an individual’s entry is suspended under a 212(f) proclamation, as soon as they reach US soil, they are entitled to raise a claim for asylum by virtue of removal proceedings. In Trump’s first term, the Administration recognized that section 212(f) does not affect asylum rights.[35] It appears their position has shifted since.

Through Proclamation 10888, Trump seeks to abrogate the statutory protections Congress provides in the INA. This is a violation of the separation of powers. Furthermore, in severe violation of both the INA and the customary principles of international human rights law, the Trump Administration is currently expelling asylum seekers from US soil. Since January 20th, the US Government has overridden asylum procedures to deport migrants without conducting fear interviews. Individuals and families have been deported to places where they face persecution and torture.[36] This constitutes refoulement which is internationally prohibited.[37] Trump’s mechanism of deportation through Panama directly relies on denying migrants access to asylum, a routine established through Proclamation 10888.

In recent public comments, President Trump asserted that the repatriation of the Panama Canal was not a diplomatic agreement, but a “gift” from the US. He continued to insist that China is operating the canal, and the US Navy is being overcharged for passage, suggesting the canal has not maintained neutrality.[38] This is all part of a saber-rattling campaign. Panama’s compliance with US demands, despite the phoniness of Trump’s claims, is proof of the enduring power differential between the countries. Without a military of their own, the Panamanian government would rather accept and attempt to deport hundreds of asylum-seeking migrants from the US than face possible military action.[39] Trump has exploited this vulnerability to expedite his mass deportation agenda, expelling asylum-seekers who would be difficult to deport from the US and forcing Panama to arrange their return to their countries of origin instead.[40]

As the situation in Panama is still developing, there are few confirmed details about what exactly is occurring. The New York Times reports that about 350 migrants who had arrived at the southern border of the US seeking asylum were flown to Panama on military planes and locked in the Decapolis Hotel Panama in Panama City for nearly a week, stripped of their phones and passports, and denied access to their lawyers. In the meantime, Panamanian officials were preparing a camp near the Darién jungle for their transfer. Most of these deportees are not from Central America but from Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries with which the US has frosty relations. The group includes multiple children. Though the DHS stated that none of the migrants expressed fear of returning to their country of origin during the removal process, individuals detained in Panama City have emphasized the opposite, even that “a flight home would mean death.” An Iranian woman fleeing religious persecution reported that the migrants were not informed of their destination when loaded onto the military plane and, thus, had no opportunity to express fear of being sent to Panama. Because the migrants are no longer on US soil, the US government is not responsible for ensuring their humane treatment, and they lose entitlement to asylum processes.[41]

Overall, the Panamanian government has refrained from providing procedural details on their plans for the migrants. The Panamanian President stated that the government’s plan is to return migrants to their countries of origin, but as the US was unable to do so, it is unclear how they intend to achieve this. Panama has also stated that the migrants are being overseen by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Refugee Agency. A spokesperson from the IOM stated that the organization was uninvolved “in the detention or restriction of movement of individuals,” while the UN Refugee Agency specified that they are only providing funds. Neither organization has a regular presence at the camp in Darién.[42]

The Panamanian Deputy Foreign Minister, Carlos Ruiz-Hernández, confirmed that migrants are being transferred to the Darién camp but denied that the migrants are detainees, saying, “It’s a migrant camp where they will be taken care of — not a detention camp.”[43] After being permitted to visit the camp, however, UN Rapporteur Gehad Madi referred to it as a “detention center,” and expressed concern about the legality of holding the migrants.[44] Under Panamanian law, people can only be detained for 24 hours without a court order.[45] Reportedly, at least 112 migrants “have said that it is too dangerous for them to go home.” They appear to face indefinite detention at the jungle camp unless they agree to repatriation.[46]

On March 1st, a group of human rights lawyers filed a case before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. They argue that the US government violated the asylum rights of 10 Iranian Christians on the basis of religious persecution and that the Panamanian government’s detention of migrants violated “domestic and international laws, including the American Convention on Human Rights.”[47] While this is the first step toward rectifying the current situation in Panama, a court decision will come too late for many migrants. Hundreds of real people are currently stranded in life-threatening limbo because one of the most powerful democracies in the world has chosen to violate its own laws. Swift action, as detailed in the following international policy recommendations, must be taken to triage the damage caused by Trump’s immigration policies and the illegal state activities that have followed. Additionally, the safeguard systems intended to limit executive overreach, including the US immigration system and cooperative Inter-American diplomacy, must be strengthened to prevent such catastrophic violations of human rights in the future.

International Cooperation Action Plan

3 Months

·       Cease illegal actions leading to refoulement, including the deportation of asylum-seekers to third-party countries, denying migrants access to fear interviews, and coerced repatriation despite credible fear of persecution and torture. Such actions will re-establish US and Panamanian compliance with the protocols of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.

·       Return asylum-seekers currently detained in Panama to the US, allowing them to progress through the asylum process protected under the INA.

·       End the diversion of resources from the U.S. Marshalls Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the Bureau of Prisons in support of immigration enforcement unrelated to criminal activity which detracts from their own missions.

1 Year

·       End MPP and lift Section 212(f) proclamation through action of the executive or judicial branches, upholding US constitutional law.

·       Reallocate $765 million from ICE (8.5% of annual budget FY2024) to the Executive Office for Immigration Review to support hiring the 700 immigration judges required to clear backlogged immigration cases within 10 years.[48]

·       Allocate $900 million to US Citizenship and Immigration Services in support of hiring at least 1,000 additional asylum officers. Such action will aid in clearing the backlog of 3.6 million pending asylum cases (FY2024).[49]

5 Years

·       Resume and strengthen legal immigration pathways into the US including the US Refugee Admissions Program and the Safe Mobility Initiative, expanding these services beyond the Western Hemisphere. International access to US resettlement or humanitarian parole services will decrease immigration enforcement strain at the southern border.

·       Strengthen diplomatic ties between Central and South American countries, bolstering each of their abilities to resist threats to their sovereignty through joint sanctions diplomacy. Establishing this structure of cooperative enforcement will fortify the customary principles of international law.

References

[1] Tanmay Kulkarni, 2025. Canaliens here refers to the US citizens who lived in the Panama Canal Zone, not Canadian Aliens.

[2] Rachel Leingang, “How would Donald Trump carry out his mass deportation scheme?,” The Guardian, December 4, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/04/donald-trump-mass-deportation-explainer.

[3] “Trump on Immigration Tearing Apart Immigrant Families, Communities, and the Fabric of Our Nation,” ACLU, 2024, https://assets.aclu.org/live/uploads/2024/06/Memo_Trump_Immigration_Final.pdf.

[4] Al Jazeera Staff, “Why have Costa Rica and Panama agreed to take Asians deported by Trump?,” Al Jazeera, March 1, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/1/why-have-costa-rica-and-panama-agreed-to-take-asians-deported-by-trump#:~:text=Trump's%20tariff%20threats%20and%20political,agreed%20to%20receive%20deportation%20flights.

[5] Julie Turkewitz et al., “As Trump ‘Exports’ Deportees, Hundreds Are Trapped in Panama Hotel,” The New York Times, February 18, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/18/world/americas/trump-migrant-deportation-panama.html; Julie Turkewitz et al., “Locked in a Jungle Camp, Migrants Deported to Panama Face Uncertain Future,” The New York Times, February 28, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/28/world/americas/panama-migrants-deportees.html.

[6] Organization of American States, “American Convention on Human Rights,” adopted in 1969, Treaty Series, No. 36, San Jose: Organization of American States, https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_b-32_american_convention_on_human_rights.pdf; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. (1952), https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/legislation/immigration-and-nationality-act.

[7] Michael Williams, “What’s the history of the Panama Canal, and why is Trump threatening to retake control of it?,” CNN, January 8, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/23/politics/panama-canal-history-trump/index.html.

[8] Office of The Historian, “Building the Panama Canal, 1903–1914,” Milestones: 1899-1913, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/panama-canal#:~:text=Led%20by%20Ferdinand%20de%20Lesseps,the%20French%20attempt%20went%20bankrupt.

[9] Office of The Historian, “The Panama Canal and the Torrijos-Carter Treaties,” Milestones 1977-1980, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/panama-canal#:~:text=The%20second%2C%20called%20The%20Panama,months%20before%20the%20Senate%20voted.

[10] History.com Editors, “Panama declares independence from Colombia,” History.com, last modified November 1, 2024, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/panama-declares-independence.

[11] “Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty),” concluded November 18, 1903, U.S. Stats., vol. 33, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/pan001.asp.

[12] Charles D. Ameringer, “Philippe Bunau-Varilla: New Light on the Panama Canal Treaty,” Hispanic American Historical Review 46, no.1, https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-46.1.28.

[13] Office of The Historian, “Panama Canal and Carter-Torrijos Treaties.”

[14] “The Panama Riots of 1964: The Beginning of the End for the Canal,” Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, https://adst.org/2016/07/panama-riots-1964-beginning-end-canal/.

[15] Office of The Historian, “Panama Canal and Carter-Torrijos Treaties.”

[16] Zach Sheely, “Hokanson: Panama a Global Crossroads, Key Security Cooperation Partner,” U.S. Southern Command, September 19, 2023, https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/3533918/hokanson-panama-a-global-crossroads-key-security-cooperation-partner/#:~:text=Panama's%20constitution%20prohibits%20a%20traditional,border%20control%20and%20maritime%20security.

[17] Leingang, “How would Donald Trump.”

[18] Debu Gandhi, Ben Greenho, Nick Wilson, “Trump’s Rash Immigration Actions Place Cruelty and Spectacle Above Security,” Center for American Progress, February 27, 2025, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trumps-rash-immigration-actions-place-cruelty-and-spectacle-above-security/.

[19] Immigration and Nationality Act.

[20] Exec. Order. No. 14165, 90 Fed. Reg. 8467 (January 20, 2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/30/2025-02015/securing-our-borders

[21] “The ‘Migrant Protection Protocols’: an Explanation of the Remain in Mexico Program,” American Immigration Council, February 12, 2025, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/migrant-protection-protocols.

[22] Ibid.

[23] “How the Trump Administration Broke the Immigration Court System,” American Immigration Lawyers Association, April 19, 2021, https://www.aila.org/library/immigration-courts.

[24] Elliot Spagat, “Justice Department fires 20 immigration judges from backlogged courts amid major government cuts,” Associated Press, February 15, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/trump-immigration-court-judges-fired-firings-d35eed0f685739c4a19d4c8baf39113a.

[25] Immigration and Nationality Act.

[26] “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” adopted July 28, 1951, General Assembly Resolution 429 (V), https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-relating-status-refugees#:~:text=ratification%20and%20accession-,1.,General%20of%20the%20United%20Nations.

[27] “The ‘Migrant Protection Protocols,’” American Immigration Council.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] U.S. President, Proclamation, “Proclamation 10888—Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion,” Federal Register 90, (January 20, 2025): 8333, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-01951/guaranteeing-the-states-protection-against-invasion; Immigration and Nationality Act.

[31] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Releases December 2024 Monthly Update, January 14, 2025, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-december-2024-monthly-update

[32] RAICES v. Noem, Complaint, No. 5:24-cv-05011 (D.S.D. Feb. 3, 2025), https://assets.aclu.org/live/uploads/2025/02/2025.02.03.0001-COMPLAINT-RAICES-v.-Noem.pdf.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Amnesty International, "USA: Lives in Limbo: Devastating Impacts of Trump's Migration and Asylum Policies," February 20, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr51/9029/2025/en/; Immigration and Nationality Act.

[35] RAICES v. Noem.

[36] Ibid.

[37] “Convention Relating to Refugees.”

[38] Williams, “History of Panama Canal.”

[39] Al Jazeera Staff, “Costa Rica and Panama agreed.”

[40] Julie Turkewitz et al., “As Trump ‘Exports’ Deportees.”

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.; Julie Turkewitz et al., “Locked in a Jungle Camp.”

[43] Julie Turkewitz et al., “Migrants, Deported to Panama Under Trump Plan, Detained in Remote Jungle Camp,” The New York Times, February 19, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/19/world/americas/us-migrants-panama-jungle-camp.html.

[44] Julie Turkewitz et al., “Locked in a Jungle Camp.”

[45] Julie Turkewitz et al., “As Trump ‘Exports’ Deportees.”

[46] Julie Turkewitz et al., “Locked in a Jungle Camp.”

[47] Farnaz Fassihi, Julie Turkewitz, “Lawsuit Against Panama Challenges Detention of Trump Deportees,” The New York Times, March 1, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/01/world/americas/panama-migrants-us-lawsuit.html.

[48] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Report, December 19, 2024, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf; Holly Straut-Eppsteiner, "Immigration Judge Hiring and Projected Impact on the Immigration Courts Backlog," Congressional Research Service Report R47637, July 28, 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47637.

[49] Holly Straut-Eppsteiner, "FY2024 EOIR Immigration Court Data: Caseloads and the Pending Cases Backlog," Congressional Research Service Insight IN12492, January 24, 2025, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12492.